CVE-2026-69198 MEDIUM

CVE-2026-69198: ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks

Vendor Beaugunderson
Product ip-address
Weakness CWE-20 · Input validation
Published August 3, 2026
Last update August 4, 2026

CVSS base score

6.9/10
Attack vector Network
Attack complexity Low
Privileges required None
User interaction None
Confidentiality
Integrity

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

What the vulnerability does

01Description

ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. From 10.1.1 until 10.2.2, every special-use classification method is built on isInSubnet, which short-circuits to false whenever the address's own subnet mask is shorter than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as /0 suppresses classification entirely: isLoopback(), isPrivate(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isMulticast(), isUnspecified(), isBroadcast(), isULA(), and getType() all report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the real internal target. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. The underlying bit comparison is correct, and mask(n) already returns the first n bits of the full parsed address independently of subnetMask; the defect is solely that the containment guard sits in the classification path. This issue is fixed in version 10.2.2.

Key dates

02Disclosure timeline

August 3, 2026 CVE published
August 4, 2026 Record updated

Related vulnerabilities

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